1 According to G Teubner, ‗Coincidentia Oppositorum: Hybrid Networks beyond Contract and Organisation' (ch 1), in this volume, a network, or combination of contracts, exists where, first, the bilateral contracts reciprocally refer to each other in the performance programme or in contractual practice; secondly, there is reference in the content to the overall project; and thirdly, there is legally relevant close co-operation between the parties to the combination (‗economic unit'). 2 For the first time in the Agreement of 9 December 1977. The Swiss Federal Court decision 109 Ib 146 was about the CDB of 1 July 1982. See the comparison of the first two versions of the CDB in P Nobel, ‗Die neuen Standesregeln zur Sorgfaltspflicht der Banken ' (1987) 39 Wirtschaft und Recht 149-66, with further references. 3 In particular, the Treuhänder-Verband might have wanted to counter damage to its image. However, the overwhelming majority of the banks actually participated in the CDB, so that the limited choice of bank did amount to an economic disadvantage for the members of the Treuhänder-Verband. 4 Federal Court decision 109 Ib 146 at 146 et seq. 5 Bank's note to the Treuhänder-Verband was not an administrative (public law) decision that could be challenged. This is because the CDB was primarily aimed at taking over provisions from foreign penal law, in order to avert conflicts with foreign legal systems.
However, since the actions targeted in the CDB-such as active assistance with tax offences or currency offences abroad-were not punishable in Swiss law, the interests theory did not lead to an allocation to public law. 10 And in the subordination theory, it would seem that, while the National Bank had been ‗encouraged' to act by the Swiss Federal Council (ie, the Swiss Government), it was not exercising any specific legislative mandate, and the individual banks had accordingly been at liberty either to adhere to the Agreement or not. The fact that a similar arrangement could also have been created by statute [p. 258] was not relevant in the eyes of the court. Accordingly, the CDB was to be defined as a private contract. 11 At most, a complaint to a supervisory authority might be brought against the National Bank, which in its private-law activities analogously [sic] has to comply with the constitutional basic rights. In particular, even as a subject of private law it must not confer rights or impose duties legally unequally or arbitrarily.
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Legal scholars are to date in disagreement as to the law's needful adaptations to the emerging trends to co-operationism and privatisation (or ‗essentialisation'
(Verwesentlichung) of the state's functions 13 ): on the one hand, there are calls for the extension of public law, 14 though this certainly brings the danger of stifling the new-style co-operationist forms under restrictive regulations. 15 On the other, there are suggestions that the law should follow social changes by shifting corresponding situations from 10 public to private law and especially the law of contract, 16 which would, however, thus be confronted with standards hitherto located in public law, and thus be irritated in the extreme, to the point of calling its own premises into question.
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This extremely demanding adaptation of law to increasing governmental cooperationism is however-as is evident from decision 109 Ib 146-at the same time, exposed to further irritations from equally far-reaching and novel changes in the environment: ie, the shifts from [p. 259] market-related organisational structures on the one hand, and hierarchical ones on the other (reflected in law as contract and corporations) to network-type structures, for which the law is not prepared with categories of its own.
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These two new-style contextual conditions of co-operationism and network structures do not always appear as isolated contextual constraints on law, but may be so interlinked as to heighten the demands on the law's adaptability. Hitherto, such phenomena have been studied under the heading of ‗self-regulation under governmental direction', 19 though this places insufficient emphasis on, first, the active role of the economy and secondly, the new-style network organisation. 20 It seems manifest to me that co-operationism between the state and private persons happening purely in individual contracts in the foreground-yet nonetheless in the background in network structures 16 Thus, for example, A Marti, ‗Aufgabenteilung zwischen Staat und Privaten auf dem Gebiet der Rechtsetzung-Ende des staatlichen Rechtsetzungsmonopols? ' (2002) . The EBK issues instructions as to which institutions a declaration on actual entitlement must be secured from (Art 3, N 34.4), receives notices of infringements from the audit office and the CDB supervisory commission (Arts 10 and 12(9)) and authorises amendments to the CDB (Art 14(3)). 26 From an evolutionary-theory viewpoint, these further developments can be brought together under the concept of punctuated equilibrium: variations do not appear in a system uniformly and gradually, but are generated above all by unexpected or even scandalous events that cause the possibility of actual evolutionary jumps (in the sense of contingency), thus differing from either arbitrariness or predetermination. Instead, the academic critique, on the one hand, and the scandals and broader events, on the other, engendered politically-led legislative impulses that reduced the CDB's importance as self-regulation, and increasingly subjected it to political structures. Even today, the economic, political and legal systems have yet to find lasting stability in their co-evolution in the area of the CDB, something which is reflected in the continuing criticisms of the doctrinal classification of the CDB as private law by legal scholars.
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[p. 264] I shall cast an eye below over the law's neighbouring disciplines, in order to sound out the conditions for some possibilities of overcoming the crisis. 41 At the centre is the thesis that, while legal science had identified the new-style co-operationism between the state and private persons as the starting point for the continuing irritationswhich are at the point of intersection of a clash of discourses of Babylonian 37 For the dogmatic presentation of the CDB, see the relevant literature, eg, Nobel, Schweizerisches Finanzmarktrecht (n 6 above) § 6, with exhaustive literature references. 38 We shall return to the link between the economy and politics in the network: III.2. 39 Note 27 above. 40 According to di Fabio, this finding is valid for the whole topic of self-regulation: di Fabio, ‗Verwaltung und Verwaltungsrecht zwischen gesellschaftlicher Selbstregulierung und staatlicher Steuerung' (n 20 above) 275. 41 On the call to bring the neighbour sciences into jurisprudence, see P Gauch, ‗Die Fehlerwelt der Juristen' in Festschrift für Heinz Rey (Zürich, Schulthess, 2003) fn 19 et seq.
proportions-it was unable to respond properly to these new-style irritations with the old rigid concepts, which also ignored the emergence of network-type organisations bound up with co-operationism. Consequently, it needs a theory which is able to deal with the dynamic co-evolution of the various discourses involved. I shall employ evolutionary theory for this, and, in the process, attempt to make the natural-science concept of morphogenesis bear fruit.
II. THE MORPHOGENESIS OF HYBRID NETWORKS
According to Kämper and Schmidt, the point with networks is not the harmonisation of functional systems, still less the integration of society. 42 My analysis of the coevolutionary search-moves around the CDB network to date, however, points in precisely the opposite direction: the CDB network-and very generally, hybrid networks located between the social sub-systems of society-may constitute strategies of these social subsystems in order to retain their own specific system nature and respond as far as necessary to contradictory irritations simultaneously. 43 What is involved here is nothing less than the social integrative function of evolution. 44 However, some elucidation is called for, as follows.
[ by repeatedly reducing the possible modes of behaviour. 46 Since the heightened demands from the environment cannot be escaped, the system at this point comes closer to the complexity of the environment. 47 This process in which the system lowers its internal consistency in one sub-area may, borrowing from the natural sciences, be called morphogenesis. 48 In fact, the CDB network is responding simultaneously-as will immediately be described in more detail-to at least three paradoxical demands from the environment, which result from the repeated banking scandals and the calls (admittedly uncomfortable for the economic system) to restrain economic logic. First, though, I wish to go into the concept of morphogenesis as further developed by the natural sciences in recent years, so as to use it as a metaphor (ie an outline solution that provides inspiration) in order to describe the function of hybrid networks in the evolution of social systems.
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Recent natural-science theories of morphogenesis fit almost precisely with
Kauffman's concept of spontaneous order, exploited by Amstutz for legal theory. As SA Kauffman showed, not only does a system's evolution come from the selection of suitable variations, but the selection must also meet with an internal so-called spontaneous order, which is what makes the evolution of a system possible at all. 50 This spontaneous order keeps the system in a condition in which it is best prepared for evolutionary processes. Kauffman has shown that systems are able to respond to irritations from outside when their epistatic connectivity 51 is K = 2. A [p. 266] crystal with K = 1 is, in contrast, unreceptive to external irritations, while with a higher connectivity of K = N -1, the system drifts into chaos at practically the slightest touch. Put more 46 Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft (n 26 above) 355 et seq. 47 simply, the elements of the system must be bound loosely enough to be able to take on the irritations ‗at the edge of chaos', but not too loose for the system to be unable to maintain itself as such despite the irritations. 52 The place, or ‗unit of selection', where evolution first becomes possible along with the maintenance of intrinsic rationality is not the system in its entirety-which would be unable to effect the necessary adaptation.
Instead, the system differentiates particular areas that have to accomplish this adaptation, and which are, to this end, coupled with the corresponding environment.
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This concept of spontaneous order has now been taken up by recent theories of morphogenesis: according to Harrison, morphogenesis means the emergence of a complex system from a simpler one, a process that presupposes internal spontaneous order. 54 A central place in the process of morphogenesis is taken up by the interactions between the dynamic elements of the system: on the one hand, changes in the system's relationship to its environment must be grasped quickly and precisely, and communicated within the system; on the other, change should be set in motion in the system in the other direction. 55 In the case of cells, the interplay between spontaneous order and change in form lies in a complex bio-mechanical and chemical process, in which-to put it in a nutshell-in a first step, the cell bio-mechanically ‗feels' its position (form) in its environment, and thus also ‗feels' the environment as such; then, this information is sent to the genome in the cell's nucleus, and finally, the genome sets off a gene cascade, in order to set off further changes on the desired path of morphogenesis. Put simply, then, morphogenic changes are set in motion, are then checked against the position aimed at in the system, and against the position relative to the system's environment, and, in a feedback loop, are checked against the changes aimed at, and then in accordance with this If this image of spontaneous order and morphogenesis is applied to the case of hybrid networks, it may be concluded that a system-in our case that of the CDB, mainly the economy, but also politics-will differentiate a particularly flexible sub-order if it has to respond to intensive and complex irritations from the environment. The system will do so by lowering its coherence, ie, bringing about a process towards a more complex form-while simultaneously maintaining its own autopoiesis. While the sub-order's specific rationality ensures a certain resistance to evolution (form), its dynamic elements will be sufficiently loosely linked to react to the irritations from the environment-but only so loosely as always to allow the sub-area's specific rationality to be maintained.
The form of the hybrid network with its particularly loosely-linked elements is, then-as
Teubner has shown-particularly appropriate whenever internal variations have to be formed out of contradictory or even paradoxical high-intensity irritations. 58 In effect, the point for the system is, thus, to exploit the network in order to revamp the relationship between function, performance and reflection within the system in such a way that it can react as optimally as possible to intensive, complex and even contradictory demands from the environment without endangering its intrinsic rationality. This adaptation of the system now occurs in a morphogenic feedback loop along the system's intrinsic constraints: at the loci of the structural couplings, the system ‗feels' its form and its position in the environment, and, from this information, the system takes on variations within the context of the sub-system's specific rationality, which are subjected to [p. 268] selection (change or non-change to the previous elements and structures). The modification brought about by the selection, as well as the rejection of modification, are in turn ‗felt' for their position within the system and-again with the help of structural couplings-so is the position in the environment, which can now set off new variations and selections in a further loop.
The special thing about the form of the hybrid network is that it can simultaneously take up manifold structural couplings with various systems. This gives more importance to the morphogenic loop, in which the results of previous selections can be squared with the internal and external demands upon the system, and, if need be, corrections can be made, until, in the long run, a punctuated equilibrium between the system and its environment is reached. In this light, the morphogenic loop is the precondition for a system's being able to take on intensive demands from its surrounding systems while at the same time maintaining its own rationality, and to aim at a punctuated equilibrium with its surrounding systems.
I wish now to use the specific example of the CDB network to show that, in this case, the economy responded to intensive and contradictory irritations with the form of the hybrid network, and thus differentiated a specific sub-order which created the conditions for the possibility of co-evolution for the economy with its surrounding systems through morphogenic loops. On the basis of the model of a poly-contextual society, 60 I shall further seek to draw normative conclusions from the observations derived from evolutionary theory. paradox by using both co-operation and competition. How does this look in the CDB case? In the CDB network, regulations were formulated in which the economy, to some extent, took the environmental demands into account-specifically, in the banking area, it restricted the possibilities of business action. However, since this restriction of economic rationality in bilateral arrangements was stabilised through contract law, as, from a certain threshold of collective market power onward, the result was the above-mentioned cartelisation. This means that the arrangement stabilised in the contracts became competitively neutral, since one market participant no longer competed with another by underbidding the established standard. The network, in structural coupling to the legal system through the various bilateral, but always identical and inter-related, contractual arrangements, thus obtained control over the opportunistic conduct of its participants in a specific sub-area of competition, while the network participants continued to compete with each other in the other areas.
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The economy was thus able to overcome the blockade which threatened the banking sector with paradoxical demands, through a network-type organisation which was flexible enough to unfold the paradox by introducing several levels. The networktype web of contracts was able, on the one hand, to secure the very co-operation that could meet the political demands, while, on the other hand, this co-operation-in the form of the conclusion of a contract between the individual bank and a neutral network centre-was so loose and so limited in content that not only was the form of competition maintained for the economic system, but this could correspondingly also be signalled to policy; as the network was arranged, and, as this was also perceived by the Federal Court, it was meant to constitute only a loosely associated bundle of private contracts.
How, then, is this re-entry of organisation into contract to be classified legally?
In the law of contract, it can be brought into the content of the contract (if need be, interpreted normatively) without problems. 73 A sober glance at anti-trust law, however, raises doubts as to whether the CDB ought not to be brought under the Cartel Act. 74 We may regard the CDB as a strategy of the economy for organising the sub-area of banking in such a way that it can absorb complex and intensive irritations from the environment on the basis of its internal order (in SA Kauffman's sense) and respond to them flexibly (through morphogenic loops). 75 Thus, it would, against the background of the model of a poly-contextual society, be downright fatal for the law to force the network into the traditional dichotomies of competition versus co-operation, or contract versus organisation. It would be fatal to describe it as an illicit competition agreement and thus suppress the organisation element, or else construe it as an organisation, which would fail to take the central role of the contract into account. Therefore, from this viewpoint, the so-called re-entry of the organisation into the form of the contract deserves protection-at least in so far as it allows the economy both to absorb [p. 273] irritations from the environment better, and correspondingly to orient its structure better to the demands of the surrounding systems. . 74 See also Zuflauf, ‗Gläubigerschutz und Vertrauensschutz: Zur Sorgfaltspflicht der Bank im öffentlichen Recht der Schweiz' (n 7 above); see Art 5 f. KG (Cartel Act). 75 See Section II. 76 In fact, the CDB, in which Switzerland's biggest banks were involved from the outset, clearly does eliminate competition in the area regulated: Zulauf, ‗Gläubigerschutz und Vertrauensschutz: Zur Sorgfaltspflicht der Bank im öffentlichen Recht der Schweiz' (n 7 above) explicitly states this. By the political exceptional clause of Art 6(2) KG (Cartel Act), however, the competition arrangements, which are designated in ordinances and public announcements and concern ‗particular forms of co-operation in single economic sectors, especially agreements on the rational implementation of public-law measures to protect customers and investors in the financial services area', are justified. See the Swiss Federal Council's message on auditing in BBl 1994, 564, which refers explicitly to the banking sector. In Art 6(2) KG, the legislator acknowledges that co-operation arrangements may also support competition or be of public (ie, primarily political) interest, as specifically the legislative reference to consumer protection in the area of financial services shows. This niche of the anti-trust system was able to bring in the more recent recognition that while competition is certainly the fundamental premise of the market economy, it may very However, the network not only allows the economy to absorb intensive contradictory, or even paradoxical, demands, but it also has a socially integrative function. What this socially integrative function of the CDB network consists of, and what part the morphogenic loops mentioned play, I shall now proceed to explain.
III.2 Compatibilisation of Contradictory Rationalities
After the Texon scandal, the banking sector not only had to create a market regime while simultaneously maintaining competition, but was additionally confronted with a second contradictory demand. The banking sector had to come closer to politics while, at the same time, keeping it at arm's length: the CDB network was called into being primarily How, then, was the economy able to use the network to respond to the paradoxical requirement to include politics while, simultaneously keeping it at arm's length? I wish here to distinguish two dimensions: first, communication about the need for collectively binding-decisions, and second, the problem of legitimation.
well be compatible with that premiss for firms, for the most varied purposes and on specific points-ie, product-, project-or time-related-to change from competitors to co- decisions to the political sphere. 81 For the banking sector, this possibility of communicating to the political sphere a lack of need for legislative intervention about duties of due diligence is of central importance. This is because it is in this way that politics could, and, indeed, can be relatively quickly and reliably made aware of the efforts to reach a punctuated equilibrium with politics within the economy. In our case, politics, too, was pressing for a solution to the crisis (within politics) of Switzerland as a banking centre, and, from the viewpoint of the economy, the slowly grinding and (for the economy) incalculable mills of legislation should, if it all possible, not be set in motion at all.
(ii) Contract as Structural Coupling
While the necessary communication between the banking sector and legislative politics could not have been established through the structural coupling of the contract alone, the contractual incorporation of the National Bank, a political actor of great renown, as network centre, made it easier, especially at the beginning, after the influential Texon scandal, for the network to get a hearing from it. This is because, through the contract as structural coupling via which projects of various systems could, using law, be stabilised for a definite duration, the National Bank was able to bring the concerns of politics almost directly into the network. 83 Alongside this specific ‗release' of a narrow range of irritations, however, the irritations at the site of the structural coupling were, at the same time, limited and an important pre-condition for the compatibilisation of the systems created by it: the network participants gave up their autonomy in two respects, so as to enable co-operation in the network. Not only did the economic actors involved in the network abstain from any actions which, while bringing them competitive advantages on the market, put co-operation in the [p. 276] network into question, but also reduced their autonomy in mutually shaping their business relations, while the government administration involved also restricted its own possibilities of acting in the banking sector by way of the hierarchical legislative process.
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This self-restraint of the systems involved presupposes their maintenance of their respective intrinsic rationalities. Thus, the example of the early CDB shows that the network could not be stabilised with a weakly legitimated public institution-in this case the National Bank, which while it did have the necessary reputation, lacked any suitable statutory basis. 85 This is because if the network positions itself at the intersection of the economy and politics in order to influence the framework conditions of a market decisively, then it is dependent on the link to the power and legitimation resources of politics. We shall come back to this.
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The network thus constitutes an institutional strategy of society's mutually estranged sub-systems in order to have dealings with each other on condition that they maintain their own intrinsic rationalities, in search of a punctuated equilibrium. To this extent, the chameleonic network form has evolutionary importance in rendering contradictory rationalities compatible. 87 The general picture is that the economy, using the structural couplings, ‗feels' its own position in relation to the demands of politics, in order to set off, on the basis of this information, changes in the sub-area of the banking sector through the structural linkage of the contract, which will, in turn, be brought to the attention of politics through the structural coupling of organisation, and checked for success, etc.
These morphogenic processes not only have to be respected, but also normatively underpinned, from the legal viewpoint; but, here, neither a reconstruction of the network solely as a disconnected bundle of contracts nor solely as an organisation will suffice; just 84 See Teubner, ‗Polykorporatismus' (n 81 above) 363 with further references. 85 This warning was already given by C Schmid, ‗Die neue Vereinbarung über die Sorgfaltspflichten der Banken ' (1983) as neither one from a purely economic nor from a purely political viewpoint will. Instead, the need is first to secure the re-entry of the organisation form into the content of the contracts in such a way that the process of squaring off between the systems of the economy and politics can take place at the site of the structural coupling of the organisation. And secondly, the various differing rationalities that come together in the network must be secured [p. 277] This is why third parties can be directed to its individual nodes, which, in turn, appeal against the accusation of breach of the law to the super-ordinate political aspect of the network effect, ie, the market regime. But this opens up a legitimation problem for the network, which I shall now examine.
II.2.(b) Legitimation

II.2.(b)(i) The Problem
In the case of the CDB, the banking sector could not find a solution to this crisis without any political involvement at all from the outset. Initially, the banks needed a neutral arbitration agency, both to overcome the competition and set co-operation in motion. 89 Thereafter, the involvement of a political actor helped the network to obtain a better hearing from politics. But this was not all: in order to implement a market regime, economic rationality needed the political symbols of constraint and indisposability.
But what is actually meant by this? It is already inherent in the concept of a market regime that it should apply to a whole sub-area of the economy and consequently affect a multiplicity of market participants at various levels, imposing restrictions upon their economic possibilities, and that it should, in the last instance, also be imposed 88 Thus, also, the interpretation by Messner, ‗Netzwerktheorien' (n 42 above) 50 et seq and 57. 89 In fact, the National Bank took on a leading role in the coming to terms with the Texon-scandal: see NZZ 27 April 1977, p 17 and 28 April 1977, p 13.
coercively. If, however, law-associated with the political symbol of constraint-is used instrumentally, for instance, as in our case, to secure a particular market regime, then the question of the legitimation of this law arises. The Swiss Federal Court decision 109 Ib 146 commented upon above shows these issues clearly. What was being debated in decision 109 Ib 146 was the interests of the Treuhänder-Verband and its members. They had undergone a considerable competitive disadvantage from the new CDB arrangement, and yet were unable to influence the CDB-which had primarily been set up by the banks-in any way. Moreover, the reactions to the case clearly showed that purely private-law legitimation-legitimising the legal stabilisation of bilateral differentials by the free will of the participants, and the exclusion of third-party interests by [p. 278] the mechanism of the self-regulating market-was too weak to establish a permanent stabilisation, for the CDB network amounted to more than just a bundle of contracts.
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Instead, the intended network effect, by combining overwhelming market power and incorporating politics, attained something which exceeded the sum of the individual contracts, namely, a comprehensive market regime-and did so in a key market of central political importance. Today, these issues are already signalled in law by the fact that the Cartel Act is inapplicable simply because of political exceptional clauses. 91 The legitimation issues were accordingly not resolved by the traditional legitimation mechanisms of private law, but, in their stead, recourse had to be had to political legitimation mechanisms.
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To obtain legitimation, it has to be admitted, the economy cannot copy the sort of ramified participatory procedures that serve to produce legitimacy for the democratic rule of law without denying its own rationality, which relies on lowering transaction costs.
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In this respect, it is subject to the constraints intrinsic to its system. Accordingly, the economy must find another way of obtaining the political symbolism of constraint and, above all, of legitimation for its self-regulation.
In the CDB case, this was initially done by bringing a political actor into the network by contract. While the law enabled the rationalities involved in the contract to clothe their project in the form of law and thus link to the rule-of-law legitimation mechanisms, the involvement of politics was meant to convey the democratic aspects of legitimation. 94 However, the co-operationist solution with the National Bank as network centre proved incapable of stabilisation, as the critique of the Federal Court decision 109
Ib 146 from legal scholars shows: the National Bank already lacked a statutory basis for becoming involved in this area at all. Thus, despite its great political prestige, it could not adequately convey the democratic symbolism, thus creating the danger of the very political interventions that were to be averted. Correspondingly, structural changes were initiated in the network, in order to oppose this danger. The National Bank was replaced in the network by the politically better underpinned Federal Banking Commission. the economy were loosened. The political actor was replaced at the network centre by the banks' own trade organisation, while politics repositioned itself at the periphery of the network and took on the role of overall governmental supervision. 96 In this way, the network arrangement was, on the one hand, brought closer to an unproblematical privatelaw code of professional ethics, and, on the other, subjected to a public-law political framework system. 97 These structural adjustments to the network justified the criticisms of the legal scholars who had sought to resolve the legitimation problem by extending the political demands and suppressing the contradictory demands of conflicting spheres of action.
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With the partial retreat into the traditional dichotomies of public and private spheres, the network partially managed, through its withdrawal [p. 280] into more traditional self-regulation, to lessen the danger of politicisation through direct legislative intervention or through a judicial classification as public law, which would inevitably have seen the politicised ‗public interests' alienating the network from economic rationality. However, the CDB also lost a significant part of its capacity to adapt to the contradictory demands of conflicting rationalities: the economy's direct link to the symbiosis of law and politics to secure the symbol of legitimation through a contractual connection with politics was largely severed, and the possibility of morphogenesis was thus restricted. Admittedly, the morphogenic structures remained, in so far as the economy and politics could continue to perform exchanges (or, more precisely, to irritate each other) about the need for collective decisions at the locus of the structural coupling of organisation. And with the Federal Banking Commission, politics could continue to benefit from the banks' specific technical knowledge of how a functioning market regime 96 For the relationship between the CDB-supervision and the Federal Banking Commission, see de Capitani, ‗Die Aufsichtskommission VSB und das zehnte Gebot' (n 7 above), and Zuberbühler, ‗Das Verhältnis zwischen der Bankenaufsicht, insbesondere der Überwachung der einwandfreien Geschäftstätigkeit, und der neuen Sorgfaltspflichtvereinbarung der Banken' (n 7 above is to be constituted, and, at the same time, let its demands flow into the network-albeit no longer in the existing differentiated co-operationist fashion, but only in the sense of an ordre public. 99 Politics thus lost influence over the details of the arrangement, and the economy now had no way of pushing the morphogenesis far enough for the political demands to be able to flow into the CDB directly via the structural coupling of the contract. Thus, today's numerous legal provisions in this connection are also pointers to the failures of the CDB as an experimental programme, at least, in its original radicality. 100 And even if a sizeable core of self-regulation has been left, we nonetheless have to state that today's self-regulation-as the Federal Court decision 125 IV 139
shows-cannot lead much further than a traditional code of professional ethics.
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From the viewpoint of an evolutionary theory taking the model of a polycontextural society as its basis, this development of the CDB is regrettable. This is because the original CDB network with its morphogenic structures had proved to be a promising strategy for opening up contradictory, and even paradoxical, demands at the intersection of conflicting social systems. Thus an important contribution to the coevolution and integration of mutually estranged social systems was [p. 281] performedwhile simultaneously maintaining each of their own intrinsic rationalities. 102 This does not mean that one should forget the difficulties that the CDB network raised for politics.
Certainly, in my view, the withdrawal into the traditional dichotomy of private and public came far too early. This is because there definitely are possibilities for reconciling a network structure, especially one based on the structural coupling of the contract for the integration of the mutually estranged systems, with the need for legitimation. I shall briefly outline these approaches to solutions.
II.2.(b)(ii) Rule-of-Law Legitimation
Mechanisms network is to be described as a bundle of private contracts, any infringement of the private-law rationality which, in principle, stabilises the bipolarity of the contracting parties and excludes third-party interests would require special justification. 111 However, alongside the possibility of demanding damages from the political actors, an appropriate judgment ought also to impose upon political actors a duty to act upon the network. 112 As an extension of this sort of mono-causal application of the fundamental rights against politics, the law has to call on the systems involved for a new way of applying them: a polycontextural application of the fundamental rights. This is because if politics can no longer be trusted with, nor be expected to handle, the constitutional shaping of the total polycontextural society, then the consequence is that each social sub-system has to be called on for a corresponding self-restraint, with-as its object-the legal liberation and, at the same time, the curbing of the system's specific rationality vis-à-vis internal spontaneous order and vis-à-vis other social sectors. 113 This demand may be placed on the CDB network in various ways. In particular, the Federal Banking Commission, as the regulatory body, ought to call for this self-restraint when granting authorisation to the Teubner-a normative principle, 115 or whether the observer has to take this differentiation as the basis for his model of society if he is to secure an adequate picture which he can orient himself by, need not be gone into here. This is because acknowledging the polycontextural society as a society of law can already point at the dangers, such as those described under the heading of Teubner's regulatory trilemma, which threaten if Habermas's proposals are implemented. 116 Thus, in the light of evolutionary theory, we must be warned against any too direct interference with the complex, evolutionarily-grown structures of other sub-systems. 117 The point must instead be-from the viewpoint of evolutionary theory-to support the system's internal reorientation of function, performance and reflection through law, in such a way that the system [p. 285] can react optimally to intensive, complex and even contradictory environmental demands without endangering its own rationality. 118 We shall come back to this.
However, we certainly should follow Habermas in his finding that numerous forms of co-operation between the state and private persons, as in our case of the early CDB network, cannot meet the demands of politics for legitimate regulation. Although the economy does link up with politics, it still either fails to achieve, within the concrete co-operation, the re-entry of the political sphere, or succeeds only insufficiently. Today, too, the continual demands from many legal scholars for a more strongly reinforced return of the network into public law indicate that the CDB still lacks legitimation, so that the banking sector has not yet met the political demands with regard to a punctuated equilibrium. How, then, can these demands of politics on the economy be supported by a polycontextural application of the fundamental rights?
II.2.(b)(iv) Evolutionary-Procedural Legitimation Mechanisms
The statements so far have identified the morphogenic structures 119 of co-operationist and, in particular, network-type arrangements as an evolutionary strategy for adapting to the polycontextural society. This sort of morphogenic structure, supported by law, thus makes it easier for the various social systems to enter into dealings with each other, whereby the rationalities rebounding from each other within these structures have to be secured against each other by reconfigured fundamental rights.
The difficult constitutional question now is how the different systems can be brought-by law-to take into account the differentiation of their surrounding systems and their most important demands, in order to obtain a punctuated equilibrium. To apply this to the CDB case, how, on the one hand, can politics be induced, despite a political programme that has to be implemented and despite continuing ensuring liability, to respect economic freedom even within self-regulation (as the re-entry of the economy into politics)? And how, on the other hand, can the economy be induced to enter into the political demands for a legitimate CDB network (as re-entry of politics into the rationality of the economy)-especially if legislative interventions by politics are to be avoided on grounds of the legislator's being overburdened for the specific object, [p. 286] while, at the same time, the law in a polycontextural society has neither the knowledge nor the possibility of implanting specific, effective regulations into the economy? 120 We can be helped over this uncertainty as to the right law by a procedural approach, as described by Wiethölter. He-much as Habermas has done-calls for the continual renewal of the integration of the society of law through the involvement of society in the production and justification of law, thus simultaneously creating a new type of legitimation.
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In a procedural method, the courts, in particular, need to have more dealings than before with the differentiated polycontextural society. The job of finding sociallyadequate norms must no longer be delegated solely through private autonomy to the economy and through legislation to politics. In the difficult task of finding the legal needs of the polycontextural society, the courts are, of course, supported by the law's neighbouring sciences: law is structurally coupled with these (for example, legal sociology, legal philosophy, legal history, legal psychology, etc), first, via legal theory as the reflective mechanism of law, and secondly, in a narrowly limited normative fashion, through (mainly politically) inserted general clauses as well as norm references. The systems in conflict, such as the economy, the family or politics, are, however, just as far from science-be it economic, family or political science-as from the law.
If, then, as stated above, the need is to promote possibilities for the mutuallyestranged sub-systems of society to observe each other and respond to the various demands of the surrounding systems, then attention must be directed not just to the structural couplings-which, as we have seen, enable systems to perceive themselves as the environment for the other systems in each case-but also to the structures on the basis of which systems respond to demands from their environment while taking account of their own intrinsic rationality. If these morphogenic structures are so threatened by one system that other systems can no longer adapt their operations and structures to the changing environment, the law should protect them. This could be done by, for example, a judicially-established obligation to contract. In particular, such a obligation to contract could be applied in cases like the Federal Court decision 109 Ib 146, when the political legitimation demands on a market regime established by the economy are not covered because of structural shortcomings. This, however, calls for some further explanation, as follows.
[p. 287] From the viewpoint of legal doctrine, decisions intended to promote a balancing of the relationship between function, performance and reflection within the system-in the CDB case to demand re-entry of the political demands into economic rationality-can be located in so-called niches 122 : First, possible niches in which variations with contents capable of compatibilisation may be formed should be sought in the legal sub-system coupled with the observed rationality, in our case, law of contract.
For the most part, such niches can be found in the form of reservation norms, which act as signal norms pointing to the issues in conflict. Such conflict norms are, as a rule, couched openly, in order to be able to grasp the evolutionary dimension of the coexistence of systems. Traditionally, in Swiss law of contract, the general clauses on public morals (Article 19 f OR, Article 27 f CC), good faith (Article 2 CC) and the application of the law (Article 1 CC) take on this role. 123 Corresponding niches, through which the CDB network could be brought to render political demands compatible with the rationality of the economic sub-system are, however, also present in anti-trust law. 124 If the niche and the conflict norm have been set up, the need is then to identify the specific legal sub-rationality that produces consistency within the sub-systems. Only in this way can the reason for the conflict, on the one hand, and the external form of the evolutionary capacity, on the other, be recognised. This specific legal sub-rationality is to be gathered from the relevant precedents (empirically), because it is not already laid down fixedly from the outset, but is constructed through the applicable cases. 125 Such a decision ought not only to protect the morphogenic structure in the case before judgment, but, simply because of its coarse structure, should also set off a complex process of ‗social' law-making in an interplay of law, scholarship and the systems involved in the conflict. These systems are led by the judicial considerations to generate new variations, which are, in turn, checked by legal scholars for doctrinal consistency, and then, if need be, are presented to the courts for selection, [p. 288] perhaps sent back again, etc,-until a selection capable of stabilisation has been found. 126 In short, the point is to refer the conflict back to the systems involved-with, of course, an indication of the solution to be sought.
In the 109 Ib 146 case, the problem was essentially that the legitimation for the market regime produced ought to have been brought about by politics and the law through the structural coupling of the contract. The specific shape of the CDB at the locus of the structural coupling of the contract suffered from the fact that no contractual partner adequately legitimated by political mechanisms was included in the network, so that the two systems of the economy and politics were brought together in a structurally unsatisfactory fashion. Accordingly, the network nodes ought to have been forced into contracting with the third parties concerned, until the network had linked its market regime with a sufficiently legitimated political body or established some other adequate source of legitimation, which would subsequently have led to a situation-specific re-entry of the political legitimation demands into the CDB's economic rationality and thus to a step in the direction of a punctuated equilibrium. This is because normative protection of the structural coupling of the economy and (legislative) politics also guarantees the possibility of co-evolution of the systems, allowing both of them to irritate each other with their respective demands. In the case of decision 109 Ib 146, the banks involved in the network would then have been obliged to treat the members of the Treuhänder-Verband on an equal footing with the privileged lawyers and members of the Chamber of Trustees and Auditors (‗Treuhand-und Revisionskammer') in relation to the disclosure duty. 127 Thus, a simple ‗not that way' and relatively vague demands on the legal doctrine in the light of the above-stated normative demand ought to initiate a process wherebyutilising evolutionary structures in a procedural way-empirically underpinned solutions are sought. These solutions need to obey the strict normative requirements of the law, and, at the same time, have to respect and follow the selfsame rationalities that brought the conflict before the law.
Finally, it should be pointed out that, through this procedural approach, the various systems involved in the conflict are squared off with each other, along with the law, in evolutionary fashion at the locus of structural couplings, and, thus, a co-evolution of the systems is ensured, which reciprocally promotes the differentiation of the conflicting systems-in a direction towards constitutionalising the respective systems in relation to the systems in their environment, making them [p. 289] politics and the economy, can observe each other and guarantee each other in their differentiation. Or, to put it another way, the substantive normative demand for protection for morphogenic structures and structural couplings between the conflicting social subsystems, in order to guarantee the capacity for evolution (or as Wiethölter puts it:
developmental dynamics), can be secured in the form of the procedural and evolutionary method of adjudication described, at the sites of the structural couplings between the law and the various social sub-systems. 129 In this sense, the law-as called for by democratic legitimation theories-both involves the society of law in finding the law, and protects the differentiated society-as with rule-of-law legitimation theories-while at the same time preserving the central rule-of-law function of the courts.
